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APPELLATE REVIEW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED
STATES - WHO BEARS THE ULTIMATE BURDEN?*
Howard L. Greenberger**
INTRODUCTION
Comparative procedural studies, even between countries with sim-
ilar legal systems and a common language, are fraught with more
than the normal measure of pitfalls. Serious students of comparative
problems must continually guard against value judgments based upon
ingrained prejudice. In the context of this article, an effort is re-
quired of the English lawyer to refrain from characterizing the con-
tingent fee system, so prevalent in the United States, as champertous,
unethical conduct and dismissing it on that basis alone. On the other
hand, it is imperative that those unfamiliar with the English system
of court costs eschew the American preconception that the "cost
system" favors the wealthy and as such is inherently unfair.
The fact that comparative studies are not mere academic exercises
has become increasingly clear. For, just as the student of foreign
languages develops a deeper understanding and mastery of his
native tongue, so does the lawyer benefit who compares and con-
trasts legal institutions with his own. Preconceptions are challenged;
half-truths exposed; and theoretical bases considered and reconsid-
ered. Primarily then, comparative studies permit a respite from the
every-day analysis of cases and statutes and encourage reflection in
depth.
In a partial attempt to answer the question posed by the subject,
this article considers court costs as they are treated in England and
the United States and the contingent fee system as it exists in the
latter. Comparison will also be made of the legal assistance pro-
grams in operation in the two countries as they bear directly on the
question of expense of appellate review.
* A previous version of this article was prepared for the Anglo-American
Appeals Project sponsored by the Institute of Judicial Administration under a
grant from the Meyers Research Trust.
** Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law;
Member of the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania and Supreme Court Bars.
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ENGLISH SYSTEM OF COSTS
The theory underlying the English system of costs would appear to
be based on the proposition that litigation should be the last resort
of all parties and that he who has injured his neighbor should re-
imburse him when called upon to do so. If the putative defendant
refuses to honor the demand and thus necessitates the employment
of solicitors and barristers, he should be called upon to make his
neighbor whole.' Damages alone will not accomplish this result;
however, damages plus costs will. 2
Undoubtedly, the most significiant difference between the English
and American practice with regard to costs is the treatment accorded
attorney's fees. 3 As a general rule the prevailing party in the English
courts may look forward to receiving, from his unsuccessful adver-
sary, the expense incurred on behalf of his solicitor and barrister.
This generalization is, of course, subject to numerous qualifications,
some of which will be treated in this paper.4
Obviously, some objective standard is called for or the prevailing
party might incur phenomenal expense and ultimately saddle his
adversary with the burden. Recognizing this need, the English courts
developed a number of objective standards to cover varying factual
situations. 5 One English case suggests that ultimately six different
1. Lord Cranworth stated in Clarke v. Hart, 6 H.L.C. 633, 667 (1858): "I
think that the general principle upon the subject of costs is, and ought to be ....
that the costs ought never to be considered as a penalty or punishment, but
merely as a necessary consequence of a party having created a litigation in
which he has failed." Quoted with favor in Foster v. Great Western Railway,
8 Q.B.D. 515, 517 (1882).
2. Costs include all those expenses of litigation which one party has to
pay to the other and must be distinguished from "fees" which have to be paid by
each litigant to the oflicers of the court. Fees ultimately become part of the
bill of costs presented on taxation and hence some of the resulting confusion.
The distinction is important for fees normally must be paid to the Court prior to
any court action, while costs are taxed and become due only after unsuccessful
litigation.
3. England-solicitor and barrister (or counsel); United States-attorney.
4. An important qualification that deserves extended discussion is the use
of the power to tax or award costs to facilitate the administration of justice,
i.e. shift litigation to the County Courts; discourage procrastination, etc. See
notes 14-18 for a partial collection of cases.
5. Despite the controls exercised by the Taxing Masters and the courts,
the costs are substantial. In Graigola Merthyr Co., Ltd. v. Swansea Corp., 45
T.L.R. (1929), the unsuccessful plaintiff had to pay more than $350,000. The
costs in the case of Green v. Levis and B.B.C., which took up four weeks of the
court's time, were estimated at $85,000-$110,000. Daily Herald, May 28, 1955,
p. 1, cols. 6, 7, and 8. The highly publicized case of Champagne Association of
Great Britain v. Costa Brava Wine Co., Ltd., resulted in a cost order of $40,000.
Newsweek, December 8, 1958, p. 41, cols. 3 and 4.
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standards evolved.6 In any event, the Supreme Court Committee
on Practice and Procedure (Evershed Committee) recognized three
standards that have won general acceptance.
7
Taxation of the bare minimum costs that would be reasonable,
necessary and proper to expend in furtherance of the litigation is
termed party and party taxation.7 A In the vast majority of cases,
the costs are so taxed. As early as 1875, the rule was laid down, "that
the costs chargeable under a taxation as between party and party
are all that are necessary to enable the adverse party to conduct the
litigation, and no more. Any charges for conducting litigation more
conveniently may be called luxuries, and must be paid by the party
incurring them. ' 8 The Evershed Committee recommended this test
for party and party taxation.
The second common standard has become known as solicitor and
client taxation. 9 It is nothing more or less than party and party
taxation on a more generous scale, i.e. both as to the size and nature
of the items included. 10 This standard is applied in a number of
varying situations which have been summarized as follows:' 1 (1)
where the costs are payable out of a fund wholly owned by the party
6. Gibbs v. Gibbs, [1952] 1 All E.R. 952.
7. Committee on Supreme Court Practice and Procedure, Final Report,
Cmd. No. 8878 (1954), § 721 (popularly known as the Evershed Report and
hereinafter cited as Ev. Rep.).
7A. "[O]n a taxation on that basis [i.e. party and party] there shall be
allowed all such costs as were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice
or for enforcing or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being
taxed." Supreme Court Costs Rules, R. 28 (2).
8. Smith v. Buller, L.R. 19 Eq. 473, 475 (1875).
9. The Evershed Committee advocated the substitution of the term "full
action costs" in order to distinguish this concept from solicitor and own client
taxation with its strikingly dissimilar incidents. Ev. Rep. § 720.
In the promulgation of the Supreme Court Costs Rule, 1959, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1960, the recommendation was accepted in substance; however, the stand-
ard was entitled "common fund basis of taxation."
"The Court in awarding costs to which this rule applied may in any case in
which it thinks fit to do so order or direct that the costs shall be taxed on the
common fund basis." Supreme Court Costs Rules, 1959, R. 4 (3).
"On a taxation on the common fund basis, being a more generous basis
than that provided for by paragraph (2) of this rule [i.e. party and party basis],
there shall be allowed a reasonable amount in respect of all costs reasonably in-
curred, and paragraph (2) of this rule shall not apply; and accordingly in all
cases where costs are to be taxed on the common fund basis the ordinary rules
applicable on a taxation as between solicitor and client where the costs are to
be paid out of a common fund in which the client and others are interested
shall be applied, whether or not the costs are in fact to be so paid." Id R. 4 (4).
10. Giles v. Randall, [1915] 1 K.B. 290, 295 (C.A.).
11. Gibbs v. Gibbs, supra note 6.
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paying; (2) where a solicitor is acting for a person under a disability;
(3) where the costs are payable out of a fund in which both parties
were interested; (4) where one or both of the* parties is legally
aided. 12
Judge Parker, In Peel v. London and North W. Rwy. Co. (No. 2),
[1907], 1 Ch. 607, 613, drew the distinction between the two stand-
ards as follows:
One is the question of doing the litigation .... as cheaply
as a reasonable man can do it, because possibly someone else
may have to pay the expense, and the other is a question
what a man spending his own money would reasonably be
expected to do in the particular circumstance of the case.
The difference in standard appears to result, on the average, in a
15% higher bill under solicitor and client taxation. 1 3
It is questionable whether the third form of taxation-solicitor
and own client-has any relevance to a discussion of court costs, for
it is never utilized to measure the contribution of the unsuccessful
party. Rather, it is the standard applied by the Taxing Office and
ultimately the courts where a solicitor has presented his own client
with a bill that represents the total amount due him arising out of
his professional services and disbursements, including any fees paid
barristers. Prima facie, the matter is one of bargain between solici-
tor and client, and the solicitor is entitled to charge for all matters
he in fact has done on the client's behalf and upon his instructions.
Since, however, the solicitor, by virtue of his position and experience,
might conceivably overreach his client, the Taxing Masters and the
courts exercise a certain degree of supervision and only permit
"proper" charges, i.e. charges that are not exorbitant. 1 4 This stand-
ard of taxation approaches indemnification and is distinctive in that
regard. Although solicitor and own client taxation has often been
considered an integral part of the English system of costs, it is
apparent that it is separable therefrom and, in fact, is present in
some measure throughout the United States.
12. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, C. 51, p. 650.
13. SACHS, LEGAL AID 136 (1951).
14. "Generally speaking, the decision of the Master on taxation is final:
he is the sole judge of the fact, whether the business has been done, and of the
proper charge to be made for it; and it is further his duty to inquire whether
the business was required to be done; for if the solicitor negligently or igno-
rantly takes any unnecessary proceedings, it is the duty of the Master to protect
the client from any charge in respect of such proceedings. The court will only
interfere where the Master acts upon some mistaken principle." Alsop v. Lord
Oxford, 1 My. & K. 564 (1833), quoted with favor in Estate of Ogilvie, (1910]
p. 243, 244 (C.A.).
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As a general rule, costs abide the ultimate result and thus an ap-
peal may well result in a new direction as to costs. 1 4 A The bill drawn
by the solicitor who represents the prevailing party will include not
only the disbursements and fees incurred in the primary action, but
those relating to the appeal.' 5 The fact that this general rule is
subject to exceptions is illustrated by Cooper v. Cooper, [1882], 13
A.C. 88 (H.L.), where the House of Lords denied costs on an appeal
which was brought and successfully argued upon a point not pre-
sented to the Court below either by argument or evidence. ' 6 Suc-
cessful appellants have also been deprived of their costs (1) where
they were only partially successful on appeal, 17 (2) where they have
been guilty of objectionable conduct, e.g. undue delay in the court
below caused by presentation of irrelevant evidence, 18 (3) where
they succeeded on appeal only because the law had been changed
after the judgment below, 19 and (4) where they succeeded on fresh
evidence. 2 0 In all such cases, according to the facts and circum-
stances, the appellant may receive only his costs of the appeal, and
not his costs below, or he may receive no costs in either court, or
only part of his costs.
UNITED STATES
In the United States, on the other hand, the prevailing party to an
action may reasonably expect to bear his own attorney's fees both
in the trial and appellate courts. 2' The theoretical justification for
this rule would appear to be based on the pragmatic view that Amer-
ican lawyers take of the law in action. Clear cut cases are seldom
14A. "In the case of an appeal the costs of the proceedings giving rise to
the appeal, as well as the costs of the appeal and of the proceedings connected
with it, may be dealt with by the Court hearing the appeal. Supreme Court
Costs Rules, 1959, R. 4 (2).
15. Arnot's Case, 36 Chn. D. 702 (1887); Ex Parte Hauxwell, 23 Ch. D. 626
(1883); Chard v. Jervis, 9 Q.B.D. 178 (1881); Hussey v. Horne-Payne, 8 Ch.
D. 670 (1878).
16. Accord, Donald Campbell & Co. Ltd. v. Pollak (No. 2), [1927] A.C.
804; Simpson v. Crowle, [1921] 3 K.B. 243.
17. Elliott v. Lord Rokeby, 7 App. Cas. 43 (1881); Williams v. Stanley
Jones & Co., [1926] 2 K.B. 37; Weld-Blundell v. Stephens, [1919] 1 K.B. 520;
Ex parte Cooper, 10 Ch. D. 313 (1878).
18. Diamantide v. Grosvenor Securities, Ltd., [1937] 1 All E.R. 703; Borth-
wick v. Evening Post, 37 Ch. D. 465 (1888).
19. Luther v. Sagor, [1921] 3 K.B. 532.
20. Ex parte Hauxwell, 23 Ch. D. 626, 643 (1883).
21. The prevailing party will normally receive court costs but these are
nominal in amount and are usually limited to a reimbursement for fees paid to
the Court.
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present in practice, and, therefore, one should not be unduly penalized
if he chooses to litigate his "rights." The "twenty-twenty vision of
hindsight" is felt to be an insecure base upon which to build a system
of costs, other than nominal, i.e. exclusive of attorney's fees.
State Statutes-Costs
Consistency is the exception in a country the size of the United States
which contains so many diverse jurisdictions. However, it is rather
surprising to find that two of our newer states, Oregon and Alaska,
have chosen to ignore the generally accepted rule that attorney's
fees are not included within taxable costs. In fact, both states have
statutory provisions of general application that result in procedures
that are substantially similar to that existent in England. The stat-
utes define "costs" as including "certain sums by way of indemnity
for .... attorney fees in maintaining the action or suit, or defense
thereto .... -22 The standard set forth in the legislation is one of
''reasonableness"-the fee to be fixed in the discretion of the court
and awarded to the prevailing party 2 3 (including the State and the
United States, at least in Alaska). 2 4 The clerks of court initially
sit as taxing masters, however, when there is a dispute as to an item
of costs, the matter is referred to the court. 2 5 Finally, costs on ap-
peal abide the result and are allowed by the appellate court.2 6
Far more states have special statutory provisions under which
attorney's fees are recoverable as costs in certain classes of actions
or proceedings, or against certain classes of persons. Within this
category are stockholders' derivative suits 2 7 and suits against rail-
road companies, 2 8 insurers 2 9 and employers.3 0
22. ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 2, § 20.010; ALASKA COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 55-11-51.
23. ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 2, § 20.010-20.095; ALASKA COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§ 5511-55.
24. Reynolds v. Wade, 16 Alaska 221, 140 F. Supp. 713 (1956), rev'd. on
other grounds, 249 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1957); Appeal of Spracher, 17 Alaska 144,
150 F. Supp. 555 (1957).
25. ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 2, § 20.210; ALASKA COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 55-11-58.
26. ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 2, §20.310; ALASKA COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 55-
11-66.
27. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 63-68. That the attorney's fees allowed by the
Court may be substantial is illustrated by the recent case of Inter. Rwy. of Cent.
America v. United Fruit Co. where the New York Court of Appeals allowed an
attorney's fee of $2.850,000. N.Y. Times, December 6, 1961, Sec. 2, p. 74, col. 3.
28. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642 (1914).
29. Fidelity Mutual Life Assoc. v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308 (1902); Germania
Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Bally, 19 Arix 580, 173 Pac. 1052 (1918).
30. Vogel v. Pekoc, 157 I1. 339, 42 N.E. 386 (1895).
[Vol. 1 : p. 161
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Federal Statutes-Costs
In the federal domain, a few statutes grant the courts discretion to
award reasonable attorney's fees both at the trial and appellate levels.
However, these provisions are far from uniform and their coverage
is limited.3 1 Illustrative of these provisions is section 15 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C., which has received considerable attention
in the reports:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee. (Emphasis supplied).
The very vagueness of the standard has resulted in some consider-
able amount of litigation. At least two, and perhaps three, views
have emerged. District Judge Wyzanski in Cape Cod Food Products,
Inc. v. National Cranberry Association, 119 F. Supp. 242 (D. Mass.
1954) stated "that a losing defendant must pay what would be rea-
sonable for counsel to charge a victorious plaintiff. The rate is the
free market price, the figure which a willing, successful client would
pay a willing, successful lawyer." [p. 244] On the other hand, Cir-
cuit Judge Major, speaking for the court in Milwaukee Town Corp.
v. Loews, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), held that the agreement
between attorney and client was wholly immaterial and that the
court should allow a fee that is reasonable in the light of the history
of the litigation. In Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car
Co., 166 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1955), reversed on other grounds, 243
F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957), District Judge Holtzoff approached the
problem in a similar manner and indicated that the court should
consider the magnitude and complexity of the issues involved, the
standing of counsel at the bar, the skill exercised and the result
achieved. In addition, he emphasized that it was merely his duty to
determine what contribution should be made by the defendant toward
the fees of plaintiffs' counsel; he did not conceive it to be the function
of the court to fix the fee that counsel should charge his client, and
then assess that against the defendant. The third approach to this
31. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216 (only to the successful
plaintiff); Housing and Rent Act, 50 U.S.C.A. App. 1895 (only to the successful
plaintiff); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. 285 (in exceptional cases); Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. 116 (except when the action is brought by or against the United States);
Clayton Act (Antitrust), 15 U.S.C. 15 (only to the successful plaintiff).
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problem was proposed by District Judge Clary in Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. v. Eastern Railroad President's Conference, 166 F. Supp.
163 (E.D. Pa. 1958), reversed on other grounds, 365 U. S. 127 (1961).
After reviewing the abovementioned cases, he declined to follow
either line of reasoning stating merely "that they do represent the
poles at some point between which the true standard lies." [p. 170]
Judge Clary stated the test he would apply as follows: "What, con-
sidering all the factors in the case, would be a reasonable charge for
the services of plaintiff's counsel?" Presumably that figure would be
assessed against the defendant.
The similarity between the English and American problems in the
area of "reasonable attorney's fees" is striking, albeit it pertains
to a small segment of American law. It is worthy of note that in
none of the cases set forth above was any reference made to the
English experience.
Contingent Fee Practice
The seemingly harsh American rule on court costs is somewhat
ameliorated by the existence of the contingent fee system in almost
all state and federal jurisdictions. 3 2 Apparently the only jurisdic-
tion to prohibit contingent fees and declare them champertous is
Maine. 3 3
The contingent fee system, whereby the attorney's fee is contin-
gent upon a recovery, has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of
the United States since 1884: "Contracts by attorneys for compen-
sation in prosecuting claims against the United States [are] not void
because the amount is made contingent upon success, or upon the
sum recovered. And the well-known difficulties and delays in obtain-
32. Note, 72 U.S.L. Rev. 671, 672 (1938).
33. ME. REv. STAT. Ch. 135, § 18 which states: "Whoever . . . . brings,
prosecutes or defends, or agrees to bring, prosecute or defend any suit at law or
in equity upon shares, shall be punished by fine of not less than $20 nor more
than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not more than 11 months."
Hinckley v. Giberson, 129 Me. 308, 151 Atl. 542 (1930); Burnham v. Heselton,
84 Me. 578, 24 Atl. 955 (1892). Compare Manning v. Perkins, 85 Me. 172, 26
At. 1015 (1892).
The courts of Massachusetts also treat the contract for a contingent fee as
void. However, a contingent fee in Massachusetts is champertous only if it is to
be paid solely from the amount recovered, without any personal liability of the
client. If the client is personally-though contingently-liable, the agreement
is valid. Holdworth v. Healey, 249 Mass. 436, 144 N.E. 386 (1924); Blaisdell v.
Ahern, 144 Mass. 393, 11 N.E. 681 (1887).
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ing payment of just claims .... justifies a liberal compensation in
successful cases, where none is to be received in case of failure." 3 4
It has been asserted that the contingent fee system was a by-
product of the Industrial Revolution and the proliferation of indus-
trial accidents resulting therefrom.3 5 With the adoption of Work-
men's Compensation Laws, the original need decreased but by then
the contingent fee had spread to other fields. Today, contingent fee
arrangements are prevalent in many fields of litigation-bankruptcy,
condemnation, tax, shareholders' derivative suits, claims against the
government, and, most frequently, in personal injury actions.3 6
However, courts have held contingent fee arrangements void as
against public policy in divorce actions. 3 7
In discussing the contingent fee system, Professor Max Radin
summarized its merits and deficiencies:
The contingent fee certainly increases the possibility that
vexatious and unfounded suits will be brought. On the other
hand, it makes possible the enforcement of legitimate claims
which otherwise would be abandoned because of the poverty
of the claimants. Of these two possibilities, the social ad-
vantage seems clearly on the side of the contingent fee. It
may in fact be added by way of reply to the first objection
that vexatious and unfounded suits have been brought by
men who could and did pay substantial attorneys' fees for
that purpose.3 8
The Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion have recognized contingent fees since 1908. Canon 13 presently
states that:
A contract for a contingent fee where sanctioned by law
should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
including the risk and the uncertainty of the compensation,
but should always be subject to the supervision of a court as
to its reasonableness.
34. Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42, 45 (1884).
For another view on the subject, see 32 MIss. L.J. 375 (1961) which reports
the following colloquy:
"Client: What is this contingent fee business?"
"Lawyer: Well, to put it very simply, it means this: If you lose the case,
I don't get anything, but if you win, you don't get anything."
35. BROWN, LAWYERS AND THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE 209 (1938).
36. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 177 (1953).
37. Newman v. Frietas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 Pac. 907 (1900).
38. Radin, Contingent Feea in California, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 587, 589 (1940).
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As in the case of the solicitor's charge to his own client, the con-
tract for a contingent fee is initially a matter for negotiation between
the attorney and his client. However, in this instance as well, the
courts exercise a modicum of supervision due to the disparity in
experience and position. In most jurisdictions, if the client contests
the fee arrangement, the standard applied by the court would appear
to be identical to that applied by the Taxing Office when considering
solicitor and own client taxation, i.e. only a "proper" charge is al-
lowed. 3 9 However, statutory limitations are present in specific areas,
e.g. bankruptcy, 4 0 workmen's compensation, 4 1 and administrative
law. 4 2
Recently there has been an effort to control the size of the con-
tingent fee in personal injury and wrongful death actions. 4 3 Effec-
tive July 1, 1960, all attorneys practicing in Appellate Divisions 1
and 2 of the State of New York (New York City and its environs)
became subject to a new rule that requires the filing of every con-
tingent fee contract with the court in claims and actions for personal
injury and wrongful death. 4 4 In addition, the rule provides alterna-
39. Taylor v. Bemiss, supra note 34; Buckley v. Surface Transp. Corp.,
277 App. Div. 224, 98 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1950). [Also see Contingent Fees in Per-
sonal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions in the United States, Appendix I, p. 20,
Institute of Judicial Administration (1957).]
40. 66 Stat. 426, 11 U.S.C. § 102 (1953).
41. 62 Stat. 984, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1950).
42. Shipley, The Contingent Fee, 23 J.B.A.D.C. 651, 655 (1956).
43. Verdicts in personal injury actions vary considerably, however, some
idea of their size may be given by the table that follows:
Personal Injury Verdicts or Awards
Exceeding $50,000 Throughout the United States
(Caveat: A case may involve more than one plaintiff.)
1959 - 1960 1960 - 1961
(thousands of dollars)
50 - 99 101 97
100 - 149 29 50
150 - 199 23 16
200 - 299 20 18
300 - 399 5 6
400 - 499 4 3
500 - 999 2 3
One Million and over 2 0
TOTAL 186 TOTAL 193
Belli, Matters of General Interest: Verdicts or Awards Exceeding $50,000, 25
NACCA L. J. 372 (May 1960); Belli, Matters of General Interest: Verdicts or Awards
Exceeding $50,000, 26-27 NACCA L. J. 445 (Nov. 1960, May 1961).
44. Rule 4, App. Div. 1 and 2, Special Rules Regulating Conduct of Attorneys
[effective July 1, 1960], Vol. 12, Gilbert-Bliss, N.Y. CIrv. PRAc. (1938 amend. 1961).
Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 98, 161 N.E.2d 43 (1959).
[Vol. 1 : p. 161
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tive methods for computing the maximum permissible contingent fee
that an attorney may negotiate with his client. The first approved
method (Schedule A) is a fee computed on the following scale:
(i) Fifty percent on the first $1,000 of the sum recovered,
(ii) Forty percent on the next $2,000 of the sum recovered,
(iii) Thirty-five percent on the next $22,000 of the sum re-
covered,
(iv) Twenty-five percent on any amount over $25,000 of
the sum recovered.
The alternative permissible method (Schedule B) is a percentage
of recovery not exceeding thirty-three and a third percent. Where
exceptional circumstances pertain, an attorney may apply to the
court for an increased fee under Schedule A but not under Schedule B.
Under both methods, the percentage is computed on the net sum re-
covered after deducting taxable costs and disbursements.
LEGAL AID
Manifestly, the expense of litigation, more especially appellate litiga-
tion, is prohibitive for many persons in both England and the United
States. In recognition of the need for legal assistance by the poor and
the duty of the bar to provide it, various programs of legal aid have
developed. These programs play an increasingly important role in
our judicial systems and their effect on the economics of appellate
advocacy is considerable.
England-Civil
In England, legal aid in civil cases is covered by the Legal Aid and
Advice Act of 1949. 4 5 The act is rather comprehensive in character
and worthy of detailed study by the American Bar.
The primary responsibility for administration of the system has
been delegated to the Law Society, the representative organization
of solicitors. The Law Society manages the system on behalf of the
state and accomplishes the task through the organization of a number
of Local and Area Committees. The Local Committees are primarily
made up of solicitors and act upon the applications for legal aid
initially. Any appeals from their decisions are taken to the Area
45. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51.
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Committees, which, in addition, act as tribunals of first instance with
regard to appellate proceedings. 46
The eligibility for legal aid was rather severely regulated by the
original Legal Aid legislation. 47 However, with the enactment of the
Legal Aid Act of 1960,48 more individuals became entitled to free
legal aid and an even larger number are now eligible for partial assist-
ance. The means of each applicant are assessed by the National
Assistance Board and, after taking into consideration a number of
permissible deductions, it eventually computes "disposable income"
and "capital" for each applicant. If his disposable income does not
exceed £ 250 ($1250) 49 per year and his disposable capital does not
exceed £ 125 ($625) the applicant receives completely free legal
aid.50 On the other hand, the applicant whose disposable income ex-
ceeds £ 700 ($3,500) per year is not entitled to legal aid nor are those
whose disposable capital exceeds £ 500 ($2,500), unless it is deter-
mined by the Local Committee that the estimated costs of the pro-
ceedings are likely to exceed the maximum contribution under the
"contribution formula."' The contribution formula provides that
an applicant may receive partial legal assistance where his dispos-
able income or capital exceed the maximum figures set for entirely
free legal aid. In operation, the applicant is required to make a con-
tribution which may not exceed one-third of the amount by which his
disposable income exceeds £ 250 ($1,250) per year. He is also required
to pay by way of contribution the whole of the amount by which his
disposable capital exceeds £ 125 ($625).5 2
Not surprisingly, the Act restricts the matters that may form the
subject of a claim for legal aid. 5 3 The excepted proceedings include
defamation, breach of promise of marriage, loss of services due to
rape or seduction, alienation of affection suits and election petitions.
A more striking omission in this day of administrative law is the
46. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51; Marsh, Legal Aid
and the Rule of Law: A Comparative Outline of the Problem, II J. INTER. COMM.
OF JURISTS 95 (1960).
47. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51.
48. 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 28.
49. Although the official exchange rate is $2.80 per £ 1, in terms of real
purchasing power it seems more realistic to utilize a rate of $5 per £ 1. This rate
was suggested to the author by Goeffrey Crowther, formerly Editor of the
Economist.
50. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 3, as amended by 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 28, § 2.
51. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 51, § 2, as amended by 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 28, § 1.
52. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51 § 3, as amended by 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 28, § 2.
53. Parts I and II, First Schedule, Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 &
13 Geo. 6, c. 51.
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absence of any provision for legal aid before administrative tribunals
or arbitrators.
Although the original Legal Aid Act limited the remuneration of
solicitors and barristers to 85% of their normal remuneration in
similar non-aided actions, 5 4 pursuant to authority contained in the
1960 Act this figure was raised to 90%. 5 5
The Legal Aid program is financed from a number of sources. The
Fund is augmented by contributions from partially assisted persons
and the costs recovered from unsuccessful non-legally aided parties.
Due undoubtedly to the preliminary screening by the Local Commit-
tees, an amazingly high percentage of legally assisted persons are
successful. The state supplies the "deficit," which has averaged
less than 50% of the total expenditure. During the first eight and a
half years of operation the total cost to the state was approximately
$28 million.5 6
However, one other hidden cost of the program should be men-
tioned. Not only must the non-assisted opponent of an assisted per-
son pay full costs into the Fund if he loses, but, if he wins, he can
only recover from the assisted person such costs as the court con-
siders reasonable. In view of the limited resources of the assisted
person and the fact that his assets have already been scrutinized by
the Local Committee, the recoverable costs are effectively limited to
the amount of contribution the assisted person has had to pay into
the Fund, if any. Although the rule appears harsh and unfair, the
non-assisted party may not sue the Legal Aid Fund which has, in
effect, been responsible for the suit.5 7 Thus, it is apparent that the
non-assisted parties who are successful, albeit infrequently, indirectly
contribute to the financial support of the program. 5 8
54. Third Schedule, §§ 1 and 2, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51.
55. 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 28, § 2; Legal Aid (General) Regs., 1960 (S.I. 1960, No.
2369).
56. Marsh, op. cit. supra note 46.
57. Legal Aid (General) Regulations, 1950, Reg. 17 (3) (a) and (b). This
provision was severely criticized in an editorial published in the Sunday Times,
Nov. 4, 1954, as being grossly unfair to the non-legally aided party who prevails
and then may find he has little hope of collecting his costs. The editorial goes on
to advocate that if no better plan can be put forward "the only fair thing is to
have the costs of both sides paid out of the legal aid fund." p. 6, col. 1.
58. The Committee on Legal Aid and Advice in Northern Ireland, recently
recommended the introduction of a program of legal aid that is similar to that
in force in England. Cmd 417 (1960). However, the committee recommended that
successful, unaided litigants should have their costs out of the Legal Aid Fund.
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England-Criminal
Legal Aid in the criminal field is provided for by the Poor Prisoners'
Defense Act, 1930,59 Part II of the Legal Aid and Advice Act, 194960
(effective March 14, 1960),61 and the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907.62
Pursuant to these acts an accused person may obtain legal aid in
the preparation and conduct of his defense at all stages preparatory
to trial and at trial if two conditions are satisfied:
(1) if it appears desirable in the interests of justice that he
should have legal aid; and
(2) if it appears that his means are insufficient to enable
him to obtain it. If there is doubt as to his means, the
question is to be resolved in his favor. 6 3
Applications are made to the committing magistrate or magistrates
who determine, in light of the tests set forth above, whether aid
should be granted. Apparently it is seldom granted for preliminary
investigations before the magistrates. However, once the magistrates
have decided to commit for trial, the question is considered anew, if
assistance has been requested. Where it appears likely that the ac-
cused will plead not guilty, the defense certificate is normally granted
entitling the accused to a solicitor as well as a counsel. A solicitor
is normally chosen from a panel; however, if the accused expresses
a wish for a specific solicitor he normally will receive his choice. 6 4
When it appears that the accused will plead guilty, the defense
certificate may well be denied. Practice on this point varies consid-
erably and, in any case, the accused may apply once again to the trial
court for legal aid pending trial. If this request is also denied, he may
renew it at the trial and counsel will be supplied at that stage.
If the accused loses at the trial stage and was the recipient of a
defense certificate, his solicitor may, by virtue of a recently imple-
mented section of the Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, prepare his
notice of appeal or leave to appeal. 6 5 The certificate expires ten
days after conviction, the statutory deadline for appeals. This recent
modification fails to cover those accused who were unrepresented in
59. 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 32.
60. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51.
61. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949 (Commencement No. 7) Order 1960
(S.I. 1960, No. 257).
62. 7 Edw. 7, c. 23.
63. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 18 (1).
64. Poor Prisoners' (Counsel and Solicitor Rules, 1931) S.R. & 0. 1931 No.
582, rules 1 and 2.
65. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 22 (4).
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the trial court or represented merely by counsel, for it makes no pro-
vision for the drafting of the notice of appeal by counsel.
Once the defense certificate has expired, legal aid authority vests
in the Court of Criminal Appeal, which applies substantially the same
standard as that followed by the trial court. 6 6 Since the applica-
tion for leave to appeal is almost always decided without oral
argument, legal aid is seldom, if ever, granted at that stage. If leave
to appeal is granted, legal aid is given in cases of appeal against con-
viction, appeal against sentence (if a principle of law is involved) and
where the court is considering an increase in the sentence. Legal aid
on appeal is normally limited to counsel.
Where a legal aid certificate has been granted, costs are paid out of
the Legal Aid Fund established by the Legal Aid and Advice Act of
1949.67 Solicitors and barristers are paid fees that the Law Society
has determined represent fair remuneration for the work actually
and reasonably done. 6 8
United States-Civil
The Legal Aid services in the United States vary considerably and
although the last decade has been marked by substantial progress,
there still remains a formidable challenge.6 9 The National Legal Aid
and Defender Association, in cooperation with the Committee on
Legal Aid Work of the American Bar Association, provides the
stimulus, experience and initial financing for new legal aid services.
Most importantly, it has been in the forefront of the effort to awaken
the bar and the community generally to the need for adequate sup-
port for legal aid programs. 7 0
Historically, the growth of legal aid in civil cases has been inde-
pendent of the growth of legal aid in criminal cases. In fact, the
latter form of assistance has been indelibly labeled "legal defender,"
and hence the name, National Legal Aid and Defender Association. 7 1
Due to their different origins and rates of growth, they deserve sep-
arate treatment.
As of June 1, 1960, there were 209 legal aid offices in operation
throughout the United States. 7 2 They fall into five main categories:
66. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23.
67. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51 § 22.
68. Poor Prisoner's Defense (Legal Aid Certificate) Regs., 1960, (S.I. 1960,
No. 261) Reg. 4.
69. Brownell, A Decade of Progress: Legal Aid and Defender Services, 47
A.B.A.J. 867.
70. Id at 870.
71. Id at 868.
72. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES, Supp., 10 (1961).
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(1) Independent Societies with their own governing bodies, such as
the Legal Aid Society of New York, established in 1876; (2) offices
conducted as departments of privately supported social agencies,
such as that established in Chicago; (3) Public Bureaus, whose
budget is provided by public funds; (4) Bar Association offices; and
(5) Law School Clinics. 7 3
In the face of these grave differences of organization, finance,
size, and demand for services, it is readily apparent that only the
roughest form of generalization is possible. Of these 209 offices, 132
have salaried staff attorneys rendering service in civil cases in 126
cities having a combined population of approximately sixty-three
and a half million people. In seventy-seven cities, there are Legal Aid
offices operating with volunteer legal staffs serving a combined pop-
ulation of sixteen and a half million people. Volunteer panels of law-
yers are available to twenty-three million people in 128 other com-
munities, large and small, throughout the country. 7 4
The classification set forth above gives some idea as to the source
of income of the Legal Aid offices. In some localities public funds are
utilized, in other areas private welfare agencies support the activity
and in still others the bar and the general community support the
undertaking. 7 5 Perhaps the outstanding example of the latter cate-
gory is the Legal Aid Society of New York, whose total expenditures
in 1960 approximated $600,000 and whose income from various priv-
ate sources approximated $568,000. Of this substantial sum $178,000
was donated by law firms and individual lawyers. 76
Each society determines its own rules as to eligibility and where
it draws the "poverty line," taking into consideration bank accounts,
convertible assets, ownership of homes, automobiles, recent unem-
ployment, debts and dependents. Average figures are misleading at
best, for a great deal depends on the area of the country, size of the
city, availability of large numbers of lawyers and the economic
level of the community. 7 7 However, it may be stated that there has
been a movement away from rigid standards of eligibility and a tend-
73. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES, 87-122 (1951).
74. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 10-11.
75. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 62-64.
Chart III of the same source indicates that Legal Aid offices in 1959 received
support from the following sources:
Community Chests and United Funds 55%
Bar Associations and Lawyers 12%
Tax Funds 7%
Clients 5%
Other 21%
76. 85th Ann. Rep., Legal Aid Society, N.Y. (1960).
77. BROWNELL, op. cit, supra note 73, at 66-70.
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ency to repose a measure of discretion as to borderline cases with the
attorney in charge of the office. This is especially true where the
Legal Aid organization has become well established and is respected
by the Bar.
It is regrettable to note that financial inability to employ counsel
and the presentation of a legally meritorious case are not the only
tests that a party must pass. Some of the existing legal aid organi-
zations restrict their practice, refusing to handle some of the follow-
ing types of cases: divorce and annulment of marriage; bankruptcy;
workmen's compensation; personal injury and tort cases (even cases
in which a contingent fee arrangement would not be financially feas-
ible); adoptions; and Court cases (i.e. some offices handle no cases
which require a court appearance).78
There is little available information concerning the scope of ap-
pellate legal aid. Emery Brownell, in his book "Legal Aid in the
United States," fails to discuss or even mention the topic. However,
the Legal Aid Society of New York does collate such information.
During the calendar year 1960 their report indicates a total of four
appeals. While not altogether comparable, it should be noted that
during this same year the Society received 39,931 applications for
civil assistance. 7 9
United States-Criminal
Three general systems exist in the United States by which counsel
is provided to indigent, unrepresented persons accused of crime: (1)
assigned unpaid counsel serving, in response to public and professional
duty; (2) assigned paid counsel, with compensation fixed by general
statute or by the court; and (3) defender offices, publicly or privately
financed. 8 0
On a nationwide basis, the latest statistics indicate that in non-
capital felony cases 40.8% of the population is served by paid as-
signed counsel; 24.8% by public and private defenders; and 34.4% by
unpaid assigned counsel or none. 8 ' When analyzed on a county by
county basis, the picture varies to some extent: 55% of the counties
in the United States provide paid assigned counsel; 2.9% offer pub-
lic or private defenders; and in 38.1% unpaid assigned counsel or no
legal assistance is provided.8 2 As of June 1, 1960, thirty-two states
compensate assigned counsel,, in cases other than capital, but in six
78. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 73, at 73-76.
79. Statistical Supp. to the 85th Ann. Rep. of the Legal Aid Society (N.Y.)
for the Year 1960, p. 7.
80. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 73, at 123.
81. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 13.
82. bid.
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of these states the assignment is not mandatory. In four additional
states, paid counsel is assigned as a matter of right only in capital
offenses. 8 3
A study of criminal legal assistance has been conducted within the
past year by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. The report of
that study, "Equal Justice for the Accused," 8 4 asserts that although
in theory the assigned counsel system can provide the scope of rep-
resentation which the committee believed to be desirable, it is ex-
tremely difficult for it to do so in most urban communities. The com-
mittee found that the quality of representation is not uniformly
experienced, competent and zealous; investigatory and other facilities
necessary for a complete defense are not provided, the system does
not come into operation at a sufficiently early stage of the proceed-
ings so that it can fully advise and protect and often does not con-
tinue through appeal. It was, however, found to possess, in theory at
least, the virtue of undivided loyalty by defense counsel to the indi-
gent defendant.8 5
The existing defender offices are of primarily two kinds-public
defender and voluntary defender, the former tax supported and the
latter privately supported.8 6 In 1960, there were 96 defender offices
in operation, an increase in the past decade of 66 offices. 8 7 In many
areas these are separately organized and financed organizations with
no formal connection with the local legal aid organizations. However,
in some localities, notably New York City, the organizations are
merged. A significant development in the past decade is the mixed
private-public service such as that established in Puerto Rico in 1952.
The privately supported legal aid society receives appropriations of
tax funds for the conduct of its defender program. The plan is also
in operation in five cities in the continental United States.8 8
The activities of the Legal Aid Society of New York are signal not
only because of its long history, but because of its extensive activity
in the criminal field. During 1960 the Criminal Courts Branch serv-
iced 44,817 cases, both in the state and federal courts. The Branch
83. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 12-15; But see, VON MEHREN, EQUAL
JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED (1959) Appendix (which indicates that there are only
six states that do not pay counsel representing indigent defendants in capital
cases-Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah.
84. VON MEHREN, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED (1959).
85. Id at 26-29 and 62-78.
86. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 73, at 125.
87. BROWNELL, op. cit. aupra note 72, at 12-14.
88. BROWNELL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 57-58.
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employed 32 full-time attorneys and three investigators and has
steadily expanded its area and scope of coverage.8 9
The appellate activities of defender organizations are as poorly
reported as the appellate activities of legal aid organizations. For-
tunately, the Legal Aid Society of New York does compile such infor-
mation. Although typical in many respects, the Society not only
provides service in the Appellate Courts but maintains a Criminal
Appeals Office. In 1960 this office handled 135 appeals, 124 to state
Appellate Courts and 11 to the Federal Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. 9 0 During 1961 there has been a substantial increase
in the work of the Appeals Office, the office having received assign-
ments in 232 appeals. 9 1
CONCLUSION
It is quite apparent that there are a number of areas in which our
practice and procedure could and should be improved. Certainly, our
courts should be cognizant of the great body of English law on the
subject of "reasonable attorney's fees." Every practitioner who faces
the problem of briefing the question should study the host of English
reports that have given substance to this nebulous concept. At the
same time, a careful scrutiny should be made of the procedures fol-
lowed in Oregon and Alaska in regard to costs. We should inquire
into both the legal and sociological effects of their system for it may
supply one of the answers to the problem of court congestion. The
assessment of costs as an instrument in the administration of justice
has hardly been considered in this country.
The growth of organized bar activity in the United States has been
heralded for its potential benefit to the legal profession. Equally as
important is its potential for effective reform of outmoded institu-
tions and concepts. More vigorous self-policing of the contingent
fee practice throughout the nation should be high on the list of prior-
ity activities. Prophylactic activity is a must and in that regard the
New York system appears to have merit. It provides a means of
self-control and self-policing to assure protection from the unfair
and unscrupulous. More importantly it operates prior to any diffi-.
culties having arisen between attorney and client and thus is far
superior to post-complaint discipline.
89. Op. cit. &upra note 76.
90. Op. cit. supra note 79 at 36.
91. This information is based on the weekly tabulations prepared by the
Chief, Criminal Appeals Office, Legal Aid Society (N.Y.).
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In the area of legal aid and legal defender activities, the bar has
been far too slow in assuming what is clearly an awesome burden.
In far too many areas we insist on operating with a horse and buggy
procedure in an urbanized, industrial society. Far worse, we often
refuse to feed the horse. When one considers the almost unlimited
time, energy and money that so many members of the bar give to
other civic activities, it is absolutely shocking to consider their sup-
port for legal assistance activities. This fence must be mended and
quickly. In the legal aid area the English bar has accepted their
responsibility and found a solution-public support of a private or
semi-private system. We need not choose that solution; but, if we
choose to privately support legal aid and legal defender activities, we
must supply adequate funds, time and effort.
Make no mistake about this matter, the funds are desperately
needed and, although progress has been marked in the past decade,
we are far from achieving even a semblance of adequate support,
nationwide. Adequate financial support should be coupled with a re-
examination of the inexplicable restrictions under which the legal
assistance organizations operate. How can we justify an office that
cannot accept court cases; one that will not accept personal injury
cases (even those not financially feasible under a contingent fee
arrangement) etc.; and although it is perfectly true that economic
factors vary considerably throughout the nation, is it not high time
for some basic economic standards or tests? As the American Bar
Association increases its efforts to raise the economic standards of
the legal profession, should the profession not be prepared, and even
eager, to provide adequate representation for those at the lower
economic levels of society who can not afford their services?
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